It is known that the value of a zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides need not exist [1] . It is proved that any number between the minmax and the maxmin of the zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides is the value of the long finitely repeated game where players' information about the uncertain number of repetitions is asymmetric.
Introduction
Two-player repeated games with incomplete information (RGII), introduced by Aumann and Maschler [1] 1 , model long-term interactions in which players have asymmetric information about the actual one-shot game that is repeatedly played. Modeling the long-term interactions was focused initially on the infinitely repeated game Γ ∞ and the finitely repeated game Γ n . Studying the repeated game Γ n assumes that the number of repetitions n is known to both players, and moreover that n is common knowledge. These assumptions are difficult to justify in many applications of long-term interactions. [10] studies two-player repeated games where the players have symmetric information about the uncertain number of repetitions. The present paper studies the model of the zero-sum RGII where the players have asymmetric information about the number of repetitions.
In the zero-sum infinitely repeated game Γ ∞ , Player 1 (P1) can guarantee v if for every ε > 0 he has a strategy σ such that for any sufficiently large number of repetitions n, for each strategy τ of Player 2 (P2) the expected average per-stage payoff is at least v − ε. Similarly, P2 can guarantee v in Γ ∞ if for every ε > 0 he has a strategy τ such that for any sufficiently large number of repetitions n, for each strategy σ of P1 the expected average per-stage payoff is at most v + ε. The game Γ ∞ has a uniform value v if each player can guarantee v. The definition of the uniform value implies that whenever the uniform value exists, e.g., RGII on one side (RGIIOS) [1] or stochastic games [4] , the limit of the values of the finitely repeated games (where payoffs are the average per-stage payoffs) converge to the uniform value as the number (or the expected number in the model with uncertain duration) of repetitions goes to infinity.
The uniform value need not exist in RGII on both sides (RGIIBS) [1, Section 4.3] . Nonetheless, v n , the value of the n-stage RGIIBS (with stateindependent signaling) converges to a limit as n → ∞ [6, 3] , and more generally, v θ , the value of the finitely RGIIBS (with state-independent signaling) with a random number of repetitions θ and where the players have symmetric information about θ, converges to a limit as the expectation of the number θ of repetitions goes to infinity [10] . The present paper characterizes the limit points of v θ as E(θ) → ∞ and players' information about the number of repetitions θ is asymmetric.
In RGII, one of finitely many one-shot games is repeatedly played and each player has only partial information about the one-shot game that is being repeated. The RGII (denoted Γ) is described as follows. There is a finite set of normal form games G m , m ∈ M , with finite action sets I for P1 and J for P2. The state m ∈ M is chosen at random according to a publicly known probability p, and each player receives partial information about m. The partial information of the players is defined by two functions, c : M → C and d : M → D; P1 observes c = c(m) and P2 observes d = d(m). In addition, af-ter each stage the players obtain some further information about the previous choice of moves.
2 This is represented by a map Q from I × J to probabilities on A×B. At stage t, given the state m and the moves (i t , j t ), a pair (a t , b t ) is chosen at random according to the distribution Q(i t , j t ).
3 A play of the game is thus a sequence m, i 1 , j 1 , a 1 , b 1 , . . . , i t , j t , a t , b t , . . ., while the information to P1 before his play at stage t is c(m), i 1 , a 1 , . . . , i t−1 , a t−1 , and the information to P2 before his play at stage t is d The payoff at stage t of the repeated game, g t := G m it,jt , depends on the chosen state m and the action pair (i t , j t ) at stage t. A pair of strategies σ of P1 and τ of P2 in the repeated game Γ defines a probability distribution P σ,τ on the space of plays, and thus a probability distribution on the stream of payoffs g 1 , g 2 , . . .. The value of the n-stage zero-sum game, v n , where P1 maximizes the (expectation of the) averageḡ n := (g 1 + . . . + g n )/n of the payoffs in the first n stages, exists and equals max σ min τ E σ,τḡn (where the max is over all strategies σ of P1 and the min is over all strategies τ of P2, and E σ,τ stands for the expectation w.r.t. the probability P σ,τ ), which by the minmax theorem is equal to min τ max σ E σ,τḡn .
Special subclasses of RGII are defined by the signaling structure and the initial information about the state. The classical case of standard signaling corresponds to A = J, B = I, and to Q(i, j) being the Dirac measure on (j, i), or equivalently, to A = B = I × J and to Q(i, j) being the Dirac measure on ((i, j), (i, j)). RGIIOS corresponds to the case where c(m) = m and d(m) is a constant, or equivalently, only P1 receives a signal about m. Deterministic signaling corresponds to Q(i, j) (respectively, Q(m, i, j) in the state-dependent signaling) being a Dirac measure; in this case we can think of the signal to a player as a deterministic function of (i, j) (respectively, (m, i, j)).
The independent case corresponds to an initial probability p such that the probability defined on C × D by p(c, d) = p({m : c(m) = c and d(m) = d}) is a product probability. In this case we may assume without loss of generality that M = C × D and that the initial probability distribution is a product probability p ⊗ q where p is a probability on C and q is a probability distribution on D. [1, Section 4.2] shows that each game with incomplete information in the dependent case is equivalent to a game with incomplete information in the independent case. Therefore, it is sufficient for our main result to handle the independent case, where the statement and the proof of the main result are simplified.
In this paper we study the asymptotic behavior of the value of zerosum repeated games with an uncertain number of repetitions θ. θ is an integer-valued random variable on a probability space (Ω, B, µ) with finite expectation and each player observing partial information about θ. The normalized value is denoted v θ . We prove that any value between the max min (the maximal payoff that P1 can guarantee) and the min max (the minimal payoff that P2 can guarantee) of Γ ∞ can be obtained as the value v θ for an asymmetric uncertainty about the number of repetitions θ with arbitrarily large expected duration E(θ). As any limit point of v θ as E(θ) → ∞ is in the interval [max min Γ ∞ , min max Γ ∞ ], the result characterizes the set of limit points of v θ as E(θ) → ∞.
The Game Model
RGIIBS is defined in the standard signaling and the independent case by the tuple C, D, p, q, I, J, G , where C, D, I, J are finite sets, p and q are probability distributions on C and D respectively, and G is a list of I × J two-person zero-sum games G c,d , c ∈ C and d ∈ D. The repeated game proceeds in stages. In stage 0, nature chooses a pair (c, d) with probability p(c)q(d). P1 is informed of c and P2 is informed of d. At stage t ≥ 1, P1 is first informed of j t−1 and then chooses i t ∈ I, and simultaneously P2 is first informed of i t−1 and then chooses j t ∈ J. The payoff (from P2 to P1) in stage t is g t = G c,d
it,jt . The repeated game is denoted Γ for short, or Γ(p, q) to emphasize the dependence on the probability distributions p and q and the fixing of the other parameters C, D, I, J, G that define the repeated game.
A behavioral strategy of P1 in Γ is a map σ :
* stands for all finite strings of I × J elements, namely, (I × J) * = ∪ t≥0 (I × J) t , and ∆(X) stands for all probability distributions on X, and a behavioral strategy of P2 is a map τ :
A pair of behavioral strategies, σ of P1 and τ of P2, defines a probability distribution P σ,τ on the space of plays (c,
, and by induction on t
The uncertainty of the number of repetitions θ is modeled as follows. The number of repetitions θ is an integer-valued random variable θ defined on a probability space (Ω, B, µ) and with finite expectation. Before the start of the repeated game the players receive partial information about the value of θ; P1 observes s 1 (ω) ∈ S 1 and P2 observes s 2 (ω) ∈ S 2 , where S 1 and S 2 are finite sets. The interpretation is that at stage 0, nature chooses ω ∈ Ω according to the probability µ, and independently of the choices of nature in the repeated game Γ, the number of repetitions is θ(ω), and P1 and P2 are informed of s 1 (ω) and s 2 (ω) respectively. The joint distribution of (θ, s 1 , s 2 ) is assumed to be independent 4 of the state (c, d). The repeated game with uncertain duration Γ θ is the repeated game Γ, where the choice of P1's (respectively, P2's) action at stage t, i t (respectively, j t ), may depend in addition on s 1 (ω) (respectively, s 2 (ω)). Therefore a strategy σ of P1 in Γ θ is in fact a list of strategies σ s (s ∈ S 1 ) in Γ, and a strategy τ of P2 in Γ θ is in fact a list of strategies τ s (s ∈ S 2 ) in Γ. The un-normalized payoff in Γ θ is θ t=1 g t (:= t≥1 g t I(t ≤ θ) where I stands for the indicator function) and the normalized one is
The value of Γ θ (with the normalized payoff) exists, is denoted v θ , and equals max σ min τ E σ,τ,µ 1 E(θ) θ t=1 g t (where the max is over all strategies σ of P1 in Γ θ , the min is over all strategies τ of P1 in Γ, and E σ,τ,µ stands for the expectation with respect to the probability P σ,τ,µ induced on the joint probability of the number of repetitions θ and the play by σ, τ, µ). We are interested in the asymptotic behavior of v θ as the expected duration E(θ) goes to ∞.
Given p ∈ ∆(C) and q ∈ ∆(D) we denote by
and by u(p, q) its minmax value. For x ∈ ∆(I), y ∈ ∆(J), and an I × J matrix G we denote by xGy the sum i j x(i)G i,j y(j). This is the classical notation that corresponds to matrix multiplication, viewing x as an I row vector and y as a J column vector.
Given a compact convex set Y and a bounded function u : Y → R we denote by cav y u the smallest concave function from Y to R that is ≥ u and by vex y u the largest convex function from Y to R that is ≤ u. If u : ∆(C)×∆(D) → R we denote by cav p u the smallest function on ∆(C)×∆(D) that is concave in p and is not smaller than u at each point (p, q). Similarly, vex q u is the largest function on ∆(C) × ∆(D) that is convex in q and is not larger than u at each point (p, q). Note that cav p and vex q are operators on bounded functions on ∆(C) × ∆(D), and thus can be iterated. The value of the function vex q cav p u, respectively cav p vex q u, at the point (p, q) is denoted vex q cav p u (p, q), respectively cav p vex q u (p, q).
P2 can guarantee v in Γ ∞ (p, q) if for every ε > 0 there is a strategy τ of P2 and a positive integer N such that for every n ≥ N and every strategy σ of P1 we have
Similarly, P1 can guarantee v in Γ ∞ (p, q) if for every ε > 0 there is a strategy σ of P1 and a positive integer N such that for every n ≥ N and every strategy τ of P2 we have
It follows that if P2, respectively P1, can guarantee v in Γ ∞ (p, q), then for every ε > 0 there is N such that for every uncertain duration with E(θ) > N we have v θ ≤ v + ε, respectively v θ ≥ v − ε. If each player can guarantee v in Γ ∞ (p, q), then v is called the uniform value, or for short a value, of Γ ∞ (p, q), and is denoted v ∞ (p, q). Aumann and Maschler [1] , respectively Stearns [1, Theorem 4.11], proved that P1 can guarantee, respectively cannot guarantee more than, cav p vex q u (p, q) and that P2 can guarantee, respectively cannot guarantee more than, vex q cav p u(p, q), and therefore Γ ∞ (p, q) has a uniform value iff
There are games for which
3 Preliminary results
The Posteriors and Conditional Payoffs
In this section we review a few classical tools used in the analysis of RGII. The space of plays of a RGIIBS with standard signaling is the space of sequences (c,
In the following notations and observations we assume the independent case. Let τ be a behavioral strategy of P2 in Γ. We define the functions q t , t ≥ 1, from plays to ∆(D) (called posteriors) by induction on t as follows. q 1 = q, and
Note that q t is H t -measurable.
Lemma 1 For every strategy σ of P1 and every c, h t such that P σ,τ (c, h t ) > 0, the conditional probability
and thus (= P σ,τ (d | h t ) and) is independent of the strategy σ of P1.
The next lemma is a classical tool in the study of games with incomplete information. It is presented here for completeness. Note that if P is the joint distribution of
and apply the above equalities to the conditional distribution of (d, j t ) given H 1 t -the algebra spanned by (c, h t ) -we have Lemma 2
Information-theoretic tools
Given two probabilities P and Q on a finite set A, we have 5 P − Q 2 ≤ 2D(P Q), where P −Q = a |P (a)−Q(a)| and D(P Q) = a P (a) log
(where log denotes the natural logarithm and 0 log 0 = 0), e.g., [2, p. 300]. Let P be a probability distribution on the product of two sets A 1 and A 2 , denote the marginal of P on A i by P i , and let (x, y) be a random variable having distribution P (x ∼ P 1 and y ∼ P 2 ). Then (a straightforward computation yields) D(P P 1 × P 2 ) = H(x) − H(x | y) and thus
where H is the entropy function (H(x) = − a∈A 1 P 1 (a) log P 1 (a), and
As the square root is a concave function we have Lemma 3 Let P be a probability distribution on A 1 ×A 2 ×A 3 and let (x, y, z) be a random variable with distribution P . Then if P z denotes the conditional distribution of (x, y) given z and P z i denotes its marginal on A i , then
The Variation of Martingales of Probabilities
Lemma 4 Let q t , t = 1, . . . , K + 1 be a martingale with values in ∆(D) where D is a finite set. Then
where q t+1 − q t = d∈D |q t+1 (d) − q t (d)| and |D| stands for the number of elements of D.
Proof. The bound √ K |D| − 1 is classical (see, e.g., [1] ), and the bound √ 2k log d is proved in [9] . For completeness we here reproduce the proofs.
W.l.o.g. we assume that q 1 is a constant. For every d ∈ D, q t (d), t = 1, . . . , K + 1, is a real-valued martingale. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have
and as the square root is a concave function we have by Jensen's inequality
As q t is a martingale,
where the last inequality uses the inequality x ≥ x 2 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and the martingale property that implies Eq K+1 (d) = q 1 (d). Therefore
As the square root and the function x → x − x 2 are concave functions and d q 1 (d) = 1, we deduce from Jensen's inequality that
We now present a proof of the bound √ 2K log |D| (which is sharper for |D| > 4, and significantly sharper for large |D|; log|D| = o(|D| − 1) as |D| → ∞), using information-theoretic tools. Let (q t ) be (H t ) t -adapted, that is, q t is measurable w.r.t. H t . W.l.o.g. we can assume 6 that H t are finite (namely, algebras). In this case we can assume that P is a probability 6 If q t is measurable w.r.t. the σ-algebra H t ⊂ H t+1 , one replaces H t with an algebra H * t ⊂ H * t+1 and so that E(q t | H * t ) − q t ≤ ε/K, and replaces q t withq t := E(q t | H *
, where A t are finite sets (e.g., the atoms of the algebra H t ), that (d, x 1 , . . . , x K ) is a vector of random variables having distribution P , and that q t+1 is the posterior of d given x 1 , . . . , x t . Let P t be the conditional (joint) distribution of (d, x t ) given h t := x 1 , . . . , x t−1 , P tD its marginal on D, and P tAt its marginal on A t . By Lemma 3 we have
As the square root is a concave function, we have (using Jensen's inequality and the inequality
The tightness of the order of magnitude of the bound √ 2K log |D| is demonstrated in [9] , by proving that there is a constant C > 0 such that 1) for every d and K there is a martingale p 0 , . . . , p K of probabilities on a set D with d elements with total variation E K t=1 p t − p t−1 ≥ C √ K log d, and moreover, 2) for every d there is a RGIIOS Γ = M, p, I, J, G with
A Strategy of the Informed Player in RGIIOS
We present here a result of [1] that is used in the proof of our main result.
Lemma 5 ([1])
There is a strategy σ in Γ(p) such that for every t and every strategy τ we have
The following implication of this result is used in our analysis of RGIIBS with uncertain duration. Fix a sequence n 1 < n 2 < . . . < n K and a vector of independent random variables − → c = c 1 , . . . , c K , each c k distributed according to p k (e.g., as in our application p k = p), whose realization is private information of P1, e.g., generated by a secret lottery performed by P1. Then, for every strategy τ of P2 in Γ(p, q) and every sequenceq k ∈ ∆(D) whereq k is measurable w.r.t. H n k−1 +1 (e.g., as in our application, the posteriors of d before the play at stage n k−1 + 1), there is a strategy σ of P1 such that for every n k−1 < t ≤ n k we have
Mixing Uncertain Durations
Lemma 6 For every two uncertain durations Θ 1 and Θ 2 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 there is an uncertain duration Θ such that E(θ) ≥ min(E(θ 1 ), E(θ 2 )) and . Then
and note that as α ranges over [0,1] so does β = β(α).
The main result
Theorem 1 For every repeated game with incomplete information on both sides, every ε > 0, and every vex q cav p u (p, q) ≥ v ≥ cav p vex q u (p, q), there is an uncertain duration Θ with E(θ) > 1/ε and such that |v θ − v| < ε Proof. It suffices to prove that
Explicitly, for every ε > 0 there is an uncertain duration Θ = (Ω, B, µ), θ, s 1 , s 2 such that E(θ) > 1/ε and v θ ≥ vex q cav p u (p, q) − ε. Indeed, (5) implies by duality 7 that
The conclusion of the theorem follows from Lemma 6 together with (5) and (6) . We now turn to the proof of (5). Without loss of generality assume that
P1 is informed of the value of θ, P2 is not informed of θ. Note that
We prove that for every strategy τ in Γ θ (p, q) (p ∈ ∆(C) and q ∈ ∆(D)) there is a strategy σ = σ(τ ) such that
Let τ be a strategy of P2 in Γ θ . As P2 has no information about the realized value of θ, τ is a strategy in Γ. Let q t be the posterior of d before the play at stage t. Letq k := q n k−1 +1 (the posterior of d before the play at stage n k−1 + 1). Note thatq k is a function of the strategy τ and the sequence of actionsĥ k := h n k−1 +1 = (i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i n k−1 , j n k−1 ).
We now define a strategy σ of player 1. Let − → c = c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c K be a sequence of C-valued random variables such that conditional on the value of θ they are independent, c k has distribution p, and for k such that θ = n k we have c k = c.
The strategy σ will collate a sequence of strategies σ k , k = 1, . . . , K, by following σ k in stages n k−1 < t ≤ n k . The strategy σ k will depend on h k := h n k−1 +1 by being a function ofq k . By Lemma 5, we can select σ k to be a strategy of P1 in the repeated game Γq k (p) such that for every strategyτ of P2 in Γq k (p), and every 1 ≤ t ≤ k , we have
In stage n k−1 + t of the repeated game Γ(p, q), the behavioral strategy σ of P1 plays the mixed action
We define the auxiliary stage payoffs g * t as follows.
Recall that 2n k−1 ≤ εn k , and note that on θ = n k we have g *
and thus
The definition of σ implies that the conditional distribution of g * 1 , g * 2 , . . ., given θ, is independent of θ.
The definition of σ implies that for every n k−1 < t ≤ n k we have
For every 1 ≤ t we set
t is measurable w.r.t. H t . The play of the strategy σ depends on the realization of − → c . Its play in stages n k−1 < t ≤ n k depends only on the value of c k (which need not be equal to the actual value of c) and therefore (by abuse of notation) we denote
and for every n k−1 < t ≤ n k we denote by p t the posterior given h t of c k .
The definitions of σ, p t , q t , y
Recall (7) and that the distribution of g * t is independent of θ. Therefore
K, where B = min( 2 log |D|, |D| − 1). Therefore, as K is sufficiently large so that 3B √ K ≤ εK, we have
which together with (9) completes the proof of (5).
Remarks
A natural question that arises is whether we can characterize the asymptotic conditions on the distribution of θ (with finite expectation) so that independently of players' signals about θ we will have v θ → lim v n .
A simple sufficient condition is that E(θ) → ∞ and E(|θ − E(θ)| + 1)/E(θ) → 0. Indeed, if n(θ) is the integer part of E(θ) then | t g t I(t ≤ θ)− → 0. Another natural question that arises is the asymptotic characterization of the distributions µ of the number θ of repetitions that when P1 is informed of θ and P2 is not, then the value v θ is close to the minmax (vex q cav p u (p, q)) of the repeated game Γ(p, q). A close look at the proof of the main result reveals a sufficient condition. Given a distribution µ of the uncertain number of repetitions θ and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 we define θ(β) to be inf{β : E µ (θI(θ ≤ β)) ≥ βE µ (θ) Note that θ(β) is monotonic nondecreasing in β and that the distribution µ constructed in our proof obeys θ(k/K) = n k . We have the following result: for every ε > 0 there is δ > 0 such that for an uncertainty structure where P1 is informed of the value of θ and P2 is not, if E(θ) > 1/δ and for every β < 1 − δ we have θ(β + δ) > θ(β)/δ, then v θ ≥ vex q cav p u (p, q) − ε It is also of interest to find out the limit behavior of v θ for specific classes of asymmetric uncertain durations. Two suggestive examples are when θ is uniformly distributed on {1, 2, . . . , n} and when θ has the distribution P (θ = n) = (1 − λ)λ n−1 , and P1 is informed and P2 is not informed of the value of θ. Denote the normalized values by v n * and v λ * . What are the limits, if they exist, of v n * as n → ∞ and of v λ * as λ → 1−.
It is also of interest to study the payoff outcomes of repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration where the number of repetitions is known to both players, but not commonly known. A study of such non-zero-sum repeated games with complete information is presented in [8] .
